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IN HIE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

BRANDON LEE SANDOVAL,

:

v.

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20080419-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
1 his Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability thai the jury
would have acquitted but for the trial court's decision to give Instruction 56. Instruction
56 improperly commented on the evidence by unduly bolstering Creed's eyewitness
testimony and validating the jurors' natural inclination to believe eyewitness testimony
despite its inherent unreliability.
Part I: Creed's brief encounter with Sandoval and Phillips during the November 3
party did not increase the reliability of his identification. On the contrary, scientific
research shows that a brief encounter with a suspect may actually decrease the reliability
of an identification by generating "unconscious transference." Unconscious transference
describes the phenomenon where eyewitnesses confuse contexts and place a somewhat
familiar face in the wrong context. Creed, as the host of the party, had limited time to
interact with Sandoval and Phillips. Further, to the extent that Creed took notice of them,

his notice decreased the reliability of his identification because he developed an
immediate prejudice against them, thereby increasing the likelihood of unconscious
transference. Additionally, Creed's identification exhibited other factors that raised
"grave concerns'' about its reliability. State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986).
These factors are discussed in the opening brief. See Aplt. Br. at 30-33.
Part II: Neither the Long instruction nor any of the other instructions given to the
jury cured the prejudicial effect of Instruction 56. Scientific research shows that
cautionary instructions like the Long instruction have a limited ability to sensitize jurors
to the fallibility of eyewitness identification. At the time of Sandoval's trial, however,
the only avenue available to combat the jury's strong predisposition to believe eyewitness
testimony was the Long instruction. Given the unreliability of Creed's identification, the
lack of corroborating evidence, and the weakness of the State's case, the Long instruction
should have been sufficient to protect Sandoval against the substantial danger of mistaken
identification. Instruction 56, however, undermined the tenuous protection offered by the
Long instruction. By highlighting Creed's eyewitness testimony and identifying it
specifically as testimony capable of convicting Sandoval without any corroboration,
Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's testimony. Additionally, it validated the jurors'
natural inclination to give Creed's eyewitness testimony great weight despite its flaws.

2

ARGUMENT1
I.

CREED'S LIMITED INTERACTION WITH SANDOVAL AND
PHILLIPS DURING THE NOVEMBER THIRD PARTY
DECREASED THE RELIABILITY OF HIS IDENTIFICATION

Studies suggest that "the witness's familiarity with the identified suspect" may
"bolster the reliability of the visual identification." Long, 721 P.2d at 491; Christopher
M. Walters, Admission of Hxperl Testimony on Lycwitncss Identification, 73 Cal. L.
Rev. 1402, 1422 (July 1985) ("Studies on eyewitness capacity uniformly refer to the
responsive characteristics of witnesses who arc unfamiliar with the person they arc to
identify; they have little proven bearing in a case where the witness has had some prior
relationship with the defendant."); Samuel R. Gross. Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice
in Capital Cases. 61 AUT Law and Contcmp. Probs. 125. 137 (Autumn 1998) r[F]or
about half of all violent crimes, eyewitness identifications arc extremely reliable because
the crimes were committed by relatives, friends, or others who are known to the victims."
(citation omitted)).
w

Tt is unclear" from the research, however, "how extensive this prior relationship

must have been before" it increases the reliability of the identification. Walters,

Some research in this brief--particularly the research in Part 1 about "unconscious
transference," the statistics in Part II regarding the leading causes of wrongful
convictions in the United States, and the research in Part II about the fallibility of
eyewitness testimony and the remedies available to criminal defendants in eyewitness
identification cases—was taken from the opening and reply briefs filed by Michael D.
Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Kathcrine Carrcau of Sncll & Wilmer L.L.P. in State
v. Cloptcn, Case No. 20080631-SC.

Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 Cal, L. Rev. at 1422
(citation omitted). At a minimum, scientific research suggests that the prior relationship
must be an actual acquaintance and not just a brief encounter. See, e.g.. Steven Pcnrod,
Elizabeth Loftus. & John Winkler, The Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony: A
Psychological Perspective., The Psychology of the Courtroom 119, 142 (N. Kerr el a I.
cds. 1982). Contrary to common sense, scientific research shows that a brief encounter
with a suspect who is not an acquaintance may actually decrease the reliability of an
identification by generating an instance of "unconscious transference." IdL Unconscious
transference describes the phenomenon where eyewitnesses identify innocent bystanders
rather than the actual perpetrator because they "confusfc] their contexts and placfc] a
somewhat familiar face in the wrong context." Id
In the two cases cited by the State—United States v. Dobbs, 449 F.3d 904 (8th
Cir. 2006) and I lager v. United States. 856 A.2d 1143 (D.C. 2004) -the prior
relationships between the defendants and the eyewitnesses were extensive. See Dobbs,
449 F.3d at 906, 909-11; Hagcr, 856 A.2d at 1145-49. Plus, the government presented
corroborating evidence. Sec id. Thus, relying on the research cited by the State, the
appellate courts in those cases determined that the prior relationships between the
defendants and the eyewitnesses increased the reliability of the identification. See
Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 909-11:1 lager, 856 A.2d at 1148-49.
In Dobbs, for example, "numerous witnesses acquainted with" the defendants

4

"'identified them as the men visible on the [surveillance] tape." Dobbs, 449 F.3d at 906.
On appeal, the defendants argued the witness identifications were inadmissible because
the officers used suggestive techniques to obtain the identifications. Id. at 909. The
appellate court affirmed because "[t]he women who identified [the defendants] on the
tape were not eyewitnesses being asked to recall their impression of a stranger during a
short encounter in the emotionally charged context of an armed robbery." Id at 909-10.
"Rather, the three women who testified were individuals already acquainted with | the
defendants]." Id. Specifically, the witnesses included one defendant's "live-in
girlfriend," "the mother of two of [that defendant's] children" who had known both
defendants "for twenty years," and a woman who knew one defendant and testified that
anyone who knew him would "know the difference" between him and the man originally
arrested. Id at 907. Plus, the State corroborated the identifications with the store clerk's
testimony, the surveillance tape, and one defendant's admission. Id at 910.
Likewise, in Hager, the eyewitness saw the defendant "on a daily basis outside
[the victim's] apartment building" for "well over a year," "exchanged greetings with
him," and "heard him converse with other people." I lager. 856 A.2d at 1145-46. On
appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding his
expert on the fallibility of eyewitness identification. Id. at 1148-49. The appellate court
affirmed because "the studies on which [the expert] would have relied concern) ed] the
reliability of a stranger identification, not an identification of a person known to the

5

witness, as in this case.'* Id. at 1148-49. Plus, "the government presented evidence
corroborating [the eyewitness's| identification." Id. at 1149 (citation omitted). That
corroborating evidence included a witness who saw the defendant with the murder
weapon prior to the murder, the defendant's "fingerprints lifted from the maga/inc clip of
the" murder weapon, and incriminating statements made by the defendant. Id. at 1145.
Similarly, in a recent case affirmed by this Court, the eyewitnesses had prior
relationships with the defendant and the government presented evidence to corroborate
the eyewitnesses* identifications. See State v. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, 186 P.3d
1004, cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah 2008). In Clopten. the State presented three
eyewitnesses. Clopten, 2008 UT App 205 at ^20. The first witness "attended the concert
with" the defendant, "saw the murder, and rode with [the defendant] in the get-away
vehicle." I d The second "had a conversation with [the defendant] earlier in the
evening," "recognized" him "[mjoments before the shooting," and "made a reference to
the prior conversation which [the defendant) acknowledged." UL And the third "learned
[the defendant's! name, observed the confrontation between" between him and victim,
saw him shoot victim, "and identified the shooter to police by description and by name."
Id. On appeal, this Court held "there was no prejudicial error" when the trial court
excluded the defendant's expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identifications
because the three eyewitnesses "were not complete strangers to" the defendant. Id.
Additionally, the defendant was dressed in a distinctive red suit when he committed the
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offense and he admitted the offense to a state witness. Id. at ^|9.
Conversely, in this case, Creed's limited interaction with Sandoval and Phillips
during the November 3 party did not make Creed's identification "'extremely reliable.*"
Aple. Br. at 28 (quoting Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages of Justice in Capital Cases, 61
AUT Law and Contemp. Probs. at 137). Unlike the eyewitnesses in Dobbs, Hager, and
Clopten, Creed was not well acquainted with Sandoval or Phillips. He had not interacted
with them on numerous occasions or had his identification of them ratified moments
before the offense. Further, unlike the eyewitnesses in Dobbs and Clopten, Creed was
not an innocent bystander devoid of the stress and perceptual failings suffered by victims.
Rather, Creed met Sandoval and Phillips just once at a party where he was the host
and was preoccupied with entertaining guests. R. 232:44, 141. During the party, Creed

~ To the extent that the eyewitnesses in Clopten had less substantial relationships with the
defendant than the eyewitnesses in Dobbs and I lager, it is important to note that this
Court's decision in Clopten is not yet final. It is currently before the Utah Supreme Court
on a writ of certiorari. See Clopten, 2008 UT App 205, cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah
2008). Additionally, although the eyewitness testimony in Clopten was less reliable than
in Dobbs and Hager, it was much more reliable than the eyewitness testimony in this
case. In Clopten, three eyewitnesses identified the defendant, all three knew the
defendant before witnessing the offense, and none were victims of the offense. See
Clopten, 2008 U f App 205 at ^|20. Additionally, the defendant committed the offense
while wearing a distinctive red suit and admitted his guilt to a state witness. See id. at
f
iftj3, 9. Whereas, in this case, Creed was the only eyewitness; he was the victim of the
violent crime at issue; his identification was affected by the stressful and frightening
nature of the encounter and by his personal bias or prejudice toward Sandoval and
Phillips; and he changed his testimony about his identification during trial. Sec Aplt. Br.
at 30-37. Additionally, his identification was the only evidence that linked Sandoval to
the offense. See R. 232-34. The State's remaining evidence was circumstantial and
relied largely on Creed's biased feelings toward Sandoval and Phillips. Sec R. 232-34.
7

had ten guests at his parents' house, five of whom were strangers to him. R. 232:44-45,
141; 233:31, 47-48. The party spanned the kitchen, sunroom, backyard, and game room.
R. 232:48, 81-82. 85. 129-30; 233:56, 90. During the evening, Creed and his guests
talked, watched television, played pool, played pinball, and periodically went to the
backyard to smoke. R. 232:45, 49, 81-82, 85, 130; 233:90. Creed's interaction with
Sandoval during the evening was so limited that he did not even learn Sandoval's name.
R. 232:97.
To the extent that Creed took notice of Sandoval and Phillips, his notice decreased
the reliability of his identification because he developed an immediate "prejudice"
against them. R. 232:77, 91, 221. He believed they were wearing gang attire. R. 232:6869. He thought that they "didn't fit in" and that they "were giving [himj the evil eye." R.
232:78-79. And he wanted them to leave, but he did not ask them to go because he was
afraid they would retaliate. R. 232:77, 91.
On November 4, Creed was confronted by two strangers at night. R. 232:37;
233:119, 134/ The closer stranger was "crouched down" like "a line backer." R.
232:39-40, 99-100. The encounter was so disturbing to Creed that he immediately
"tackled" the crouching stranger and the two wrestled together in the bushes. R. 232:40,
97, 101. Moments later, Creed "hcar[d] a pop" and believed he had been "shot at." R.
232:41-42, 107-10. The strangers then ran away. The brief encounter left Creed in
J

The State correctly notes that Aaron Hall testified it "'wasn't completely dark*" on
November 4 at 9:00 p.m. Aple. Br. at 10 n.3 (quoting R. 233:119) (emphasis omitted).
8

"shock'' and so frightened that he played "dead" rather than calling the police. R. 232:42.
109-10. In this stressful, frightening situation, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
jury, if properly instructed, would have believed that Creed's identification of Sandoval
and Phillips was mistaken. See Aplt. Br. at 32-33. This is particularly true given the
other factors in the evidence that raise wCgrave concerns" about the reliability of Creed's
identification, Long, 721 P.2d at 487, the lack of corroborating evidence, and the
numerous weaknesses in the State's case. Sice Aplt. Br. at 30-37.
II.

THE LONG INSTRUCTION DID NOT CURE THE TRIAL
COURT'S ERRONEOUS DECISION TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 56

The Long instruction did not cure the prejudicial effect of Instruction 56. See
Aplc. Br. at 33-34. To the contrary, Instruction 56 undermined the effectiveness of the
Long instruction and left Sandoval unprotected against the substantial danger of mistaken
identification. See Aplt. Br. at 24-37.
"Mistaken eyewitness identification is the leading cause of wrongful convictions
in the United States, accounting for 88% of wrongful rape convictions and 50% of
wrongful murder convictions between 1989 and 2003.v State v. Clopten, Case No.
20080631-SC, Aplt. Br. at 15 (citing Timothy P. O'Toolc & Giovanna Shay, Manson v.
Braithwaitc Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to
Eyewitness Identification Procedures, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 109, 110 (2006)): sec John C.
Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A. Meissncr, Disputed Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36 Court Review 12, 12
9

(1999) (explaining that ''not only is eyewitness evidence powerful, it is also more likely
to be erroneous than any other type of evidence" (emphasis in original)).
Mistaken identification is the leading cause of wrongful conviction because jurors
wC

do not appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony" and "'give such testimony great

weight" despite its "deep and generally unperceived Haws.'" Long, 721 P.2d at 490, 492;
see Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability
of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 3, 23, 28 (June 2006) (noting that juries
are reluctant to accept the fallibility of eyewitness testimony because the reasons for its
fallibility are "quite counterintuitive and hardly commonsensicar); Edward Stein, The
Admissibility of Expert Testimony About Cognitive Science Research on Eyewitness
Identification, 2 Law, Probability & Risk 295, 297 (2003) (explaining that scientific
evidence shows "eyewitness testimony is systematically fallible in ways that lead away
from truth and towards unjust verdicts"); Aplt. Br. at 27-30.
At present, the only avenue available to defendants to sensiti/e jurors to the
fallibility of eyewitness testimony and to protect against mistaken identification is the
Long instruction. See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Since our supreme court issued Long more
than twenty years ago, defendants have attempted to supplement the Long instruction
with expert testimony on the fallibility of eyewitness identification, but these attempts
have been routinely rejected. See, e.g., State v. Kinscy, 797 P.2d 424, 429 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (deferring to trial court's determination that expert testimony was
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unnecessary and Long instruction adequately educated the jury about the unreliability o[
eyewitness testimony); State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59,1fl[41-44, 27 P.3d 1133 (holding
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding expert testimony where Long
instruction was given and expert testimony "did not deal with the specific facts from th|c|
case"); State v. Hubbard, 2002 UT 45,WO, 13, 15, 17, 48 P.3d 953 (holding exclusion
of expert testimony was not an abuse of discretion where Long instruction was given
because the substance of expert testimony "can be just as adequately conveyed to the jury
through the judge in a jury instruction"); State v. Macstas, 2002 UT 123, f||74, 63 P.3d
621 (upholding trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony).
Although Utah law does not currently allow more protection than the Long
instruction, it also docs not allow any less. Giving a Long instruction is the "minimum"
action warranted "whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such
an instruction is requested by the defense." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Anything less "could
well deny the defendant due process of law under article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution." Id
Utah's appellate courts and scientific literature, however, have questioned the
capacity of a cautionary instruction alone to adequately convey "the unreliability of
eyewitness identification" to jurors. Long, 721 P.2d at 488; sec, e.g., id. at 492 n.5
(noting that "a cautionary instruction plainly is not a panacea" and "[ f|ull evaluation of
the efficacy of cautionary instructions must await further experience"): Cloptcn, 2008 UT
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App 205 at ^19; Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Expert rcstimony and
Jury Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs. 43, 52 (1989) (explaining that a jury
instruction is only "minimally effective" because it "points only to certain factors without
explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory or identification accuracy").
In Long, even as it adopted the cautionary instruction approach, our supreme court
questioned the adequacy of a cautionary instruction to sensitize jurors to the "deep and
generally unperceived flaws in'* eyewitness testimony. Long, 721 P.2d at 492. More
recently, in Clopten, this Court said:
[CJourts and legal commentators have argued that jury instructions and
cross-examinations do not adequately address the vagaries of eyewitness
identification. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 l;.2d 1224, 1230
n.6 (3d Cir. 1985) ("To the extent that a mistaken witness may retain great
confidence in an inaccurate identification, cross-examination can hardly
been seen as an effective way to reveal the weaknesses in a witness'
recollection of an event."); Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit
Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, Fed. Cts.
L.Rcv. 1. 25 (2007) ("Jury instructions do not explain the complexities
about perception and memory in a way a properly qualified person can.
Expert testimony . . . can do that far better than being told the results of
scientific research in a conclusory manner by a judge[,j especially since the
jury instructions arc given far too late in a trial to help jurors evaluate
relevant eyewitness testimony with information beyond their common
knowledge.'' (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard A. Wise ct aL A
Tripartite Solution to Eyewitness Error, 97 J.Crim. L. & Criminology, 807.
833 (2007) ("[^judges' instructions do not serve as an effective safeguard
against mistaken identifications and convictions and . . , expert testimony is
therefore more effective than judges* instructions as a safeguard."
(omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jacqueline
McMurtric. The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing Wrongful
Convictions, 42 Am.Crim. L. Rev. 1271, 1277 (2005) ("Although crossexamination is a powerful tool for exposing lies, it is not particularly
effective when used against eyewitnesses who believe they are telling the
12

truth."; Michael R. Eeippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About
Eyewitness Memory. 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y &E. 909. 924 (1995) ("Finally,
judge's cautionary instructions also arc no panacea. Current versions arc
inaccurate, overly broad, and easily lost amid a lengthy presentation of
other closing instructions. Moreover, research . . . suggests instructions do
not effectively teach jurors about how to evaluate eyewitness testimony.''
(citations omitted)); Cindy J. OTlagan, Note, When Seeing Is Not
Believing: The Case of Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. E.J. 741,
754-55 (1993) ("Jury instructions should not be abandoned; they do have
some value. But in some instances, courts have used jury instructions as an
excuse to exclude expert testimony, claiming it is redundant. Because
expert testimony is a more effective solution, jury instructions should be
used as a complement to the expert testimony, not as a substituted
(footnote omitted)); Frederic D. Woochcr, Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive
You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness
Identification, 29 Stan. E. Rev. 969, 994-95 (1976) HT|he witness on
cross-examination will not and cannot reveal the factors that may have
biased the identification, for many of these influences operate
unconsciously.v); id at 1002-05 ("Although special cautionary instructions
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony take a step in the right
direction, they probably do not provide much protection against conviction
of the innocent.'").
Cloptcn, 2008 UT App 205 at ^|19. In a concurring opinion. Judge Thornc suggested that
"the time has come to revisit the boundaries of trial court discretion in excluding expert
testimony on the subject." Id. at ^{32 (Thorne, J. concurring).
Accepting Judge Thome's invitation, our supreme court granted a writ of certiorari
in Cloptcn. See Cloptcn, 2008 UT App 205. cert, granted, 200 P.3d 193 (Utah Nov. 13,
2008). At present, our supreme court is deliberating whether it is time to supplement the
Eong instruction with or to abandon it in favor of a presumption that '"expert testimony
regarding the reliability of eyewitness identification" is admissible. See State v.
Cloptcn, Case No. 20080631-SC, Oral Argument held on June E 2009 (counsel for the
13

appellant quoting the issue stated in the order granting a writ of certiorari in that case);
see Addendum A at p. 3.
Based on the scientific consensus that expert testimony is necessary to properly
sensitize jurors to the fallibility of eyewitness identification, there is a strong possibility
that our supreme court's decision in CI op ten will supplement or replace the Long
instruction with expert testimony. See Addendum A at pp. 17-18, 20-21. This result is
particularly likely in a case such as this one, where there is only one eyewitness and no
corroborating evidence. Sec Long, 721 P.2d at 492 (noting "questionable wisdom of
allowing the uncorroborated identification testimony of one eyewitness to serve as the
linchpin of the prosecution's case" (citations omitted)); People v. Campbell 847 P.2d
228. 234-35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) ("When an eyewitness identification of a defendant is
a key element of the prosecutor's case but is not substantially corroborated by evidence
giving it independent reliability, and the defendant offers qualified expert testimony on
specific psychological factors shown by the record that could have affected the accuracy
of the identification but are not likely to be fully known to or understood by the jury, it
will ordinarily be error to exclude that testimony." (citation omitted)); State v. DuBray,
77 P.3d 247, 255 (Mont. 2003) ("It shall be an abuse of discretion for a district court to
disallow expert testimony on eyewitness testimony when no substantial corroborating
evidence exists."): State v. Chappie. 660 P.2d 1208, 1218-24 (Ariz. 1983) (holding it was
an abuse of discretion to exclude expert testimony where "identification [was] the one

14

issue on which the guilt or innocence of defendant hinged"); State v. Whalcy, 406 S.H.2d
369, 372 (S.C. 1991) (ww[AJn expert's testimony is admissible where, as here, the main
issue is the identity of the perpetrator, the sole evidence of identity is eyewitness
identification, and the identification is not substantially corroborated by evidence giving
it independent reliability.").
The State, in fact, during oral argument in Cloplcn, conceded that a cautionary
instruction would offer little protection against mistaken identification in a case where
there is one eyewitness and no corroborating evidence. Sec Addendum A at p. 25 (State
conceding that "if you have one witness, and it's solely based on one witness, then 1 think
it would be an abuse of discretion, in any case, to not allow the expert testimony").
Further, the State agreed that a trial court would abuse its discretion if it refused to allow
expert testimony in such a case. See id.
In this case, based on Utah's long and consistent history of excluding eyewitness
expert testimony, Sandoval decided not to request expert testimony. Instead, as seemed
prudent at the time, he focused his attention on the avenues historically available to
him- -the Long instruction, cross-examination, and closing argument. In hindsight, it
appears this decision was error because Utah's trend of ignoring the scientific evidence
and routinely excluding eyewitness expert testimony may soon come to an end. See
Addendum A.
Regardless, at the time Sandoval went to trial, the Long instruction was the legal

15

remedy available to him to counteract the jury's predisposition to believe the eyewitness
testimony. .See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Given the weakness of the Slate's case, the Long
instruction should have been enough. And, as evidenced by the jury's difficulty reaching
a verdict and questions concerning the credibility of Creed's identification and the
meaning of reasonable doubt, it nearly was. R. 234-35.
But science shows that the Long instruction's ability to sensitize a jury to the
unreliability of eyewitness identification is tenuous. Sec, e.g., Pcnrod & Cutler,
Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Jury Decisionmaking, 52 Law & Contcmp. Probs. at
52 (explaining that a jury instruction is only "minimally effective'* because it "points only
to certain factors without explaining the relative impact those factors have on memory or
identification accuracy"); Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. at 44 (explaining that jury
instructions "are given far too late in a trial to help jurors evaluate relevant eyewitness
testimony with information beyond their common knowledge."); M.R. Leippe, The Case
for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 909, 924
(1995) ("Finally, judge's cautionary instructions also are no panacea. Current versions
are inaccurate, overly broad, and easily lost amid a lengthy presentation of other closing
instructions. Moreover, research . . . suggests instructions do not effectively teach jurors
about how to evaluate eyewitness testimony." (citations omitted)); Cindy 0 1 lagan,
When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness Expert Testimony, 81 Geo. L.J.
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741, 754-55 (1993) ("Jury instructions should not be abandoned; they do have some
value/' but "jury instructions should be used as a complement to the expert testimony, not
as a substitute." (footnote omitted)); Frederic D. Woocher, Did your Kycs Deceive You?:
Expert Psychological Testimony of the Unreliability of Eyewitness Identification, 29
Stan. L. Rev. 969, 1002-05 (1976-1977) (''Although special cautionary jury instructions
regarding the unreliability of eyewitness testimony take a step in the right direction, they
probably do not provide much protection against conviction of the innocent.").
If a trial court singles out the eyewitness's identification as testimony capable of
convicting a defendant without any corroboration, there is a reasonable probability that
the trial court's improper comment will reduce the protective quality of the Long
instruction and reinforce the jury \s powerful inclination to believe the eyewitness,
regardless of the weaknesses in his identification and/or in the State's case. Sec Long,
721 P.2d at 492 (noting that giving a Long instruction is the "minimum" action warranted
"whenever eyewitness identification is a central issue in a case and such an instruction is
requested by the defense"). In addition to being an abuse of discretion, such an action
"could well deny the defendant due process of law." Id.
As explained in the opening brief, numerous factors raised "grave concerns" about
the reliability of Creed's identification. Long, 721 P.2d at 487; sec Aplt. Br. at 32-33.
Here, as in Long, "|l]he State's case hinged on the uncorroborated eyewitness testimony
of a single witness

the victim of the crime." Long, 721 P.2d at 487; compare R. 232-
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34. Further, Creed's opportunity to observe the burglars was brief and was hindered by
the nighttime conditions and by his immediate and violent altercation with the first
burglar. Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Plus, Creed's identification may have been influenced by
personal bias or prejudice or by the stress and fright he felt during the altercation,
especially since the altercation, which involved a violent wrestling match and an apparent
gunshot, left him in "shock.'* Aplt. Br. at 32-33.
Additionally, numerous factors undermined the bclicvability of the State's case.
In particular, Creed and Porter's story was suspicious; Creed changed his testimony about
when he made his identification during trial; the evidence showed that it would have been
difficult for Sandoval and Phillips to commit the offense: and the State, despite having
several opportunities to corroborate Creed's identification during its investigation, elected
not to. Aplt. Br. at 33-36.
The weakness in the State's case is evident in the record. Before reaching a
verdict, the jury deliberated for more than eight hours over two days, received a verdicturging instruction, and asked four questions- two regarding the credibility of Creed's
identification and two dealing with reasonable doubt. Sec Aplt. Br. at 37.
With such a weak case, the Long instruction should have been enough to protect
Sandoval from the jury's unwarranted faith in eyewitness testimony. Sec Aplt. Br. at 3037. I he trial court, however, undermined the tenuous protection offered by the Long
instruction when it gave Instruction 56 to the jury. Sec id. By highlighting Creed's
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eyewitness testimony and identifying it specifically as testimony capable of convicting
Sandoval without any corroboration, Instruction 56 unduly bolstered Creed's testimony.
See R. 163. Additionally, it validated the jurors' natural inclination to disregard the I ong
instruction and give eyewitness testimony "great weight" despite its "deep and generally
unpcrceivcd flaws." Long, 721 P.2d at 492. This is particularly true given that the State,
during closing argument, used Instruction 56 to argue that the jury should convict despite
the State's 'less than perfect" investigation because Instruction 56 is "the law" and there
was a "good solid identification . . . here, you can't dispute that. There is ID. There is a
law [ | telling you there is, that's good testimony.'' R. 234:47-48.4
Thus, this Court should reverse because there is a reasonable probability that the
jury would have acquitted but for the trial court's decision to unduly bolster Creed's
eyewitness testimony by giving Instruction 56.
For the same reason, the trial court's error was not cured by the other instructions given
to the jury. !Scc Aple. Br. at 31-35. In his opening brief, Sandoval does not read
Instruction 56 in isolation. See id. at 31-32. Nor docs he "attribute all of the jury's
unfavorable deliberations to [Instruction 56]." Aple. Br. at 35 (citation omitted). Rather,
Sandoval attributes the jury's unfavorable verdict to its failure to comprehend the
fallibility of eyewitness identification testimony. In this case, Creed's identification was
highly questionable and the State's investigation was woefully inadequate. See Aplt. Br.
at 30-37. The record indicates that the jury was uncomfortable with Creed's
identification and with the State's case. See Aplt. Br. at 37. Expert testimony was likely
necessary to fully sensiti/c the jury to the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. Case
law. however, did not allow for the admission of expert testimony at the time Sandoval
went to trial. Accordingly, Sandoval relied on the only tools available to him at the
time—the Long instruction, cross-examination, and closing argument. Given the
weakness of Creed's eyewitness testimony and the State's case, the Long instruction
should have been enough. The trial court, however, erroneously undermined the
effectiveness of the Long instruction by giving Instruction 56 to the jury.
19

CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse and remand for a new trial because the trial court
impermissibly commented on the evidence when it gave Instruction 56 to the jury.
SUBMITTHD this _ \ 2 ? day of August, 2009.

r i
LORI J. SliPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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1

Oial Aigumcnt 6/1/2009

i

JUSTICE DURHAM:

We're here for oral argument in number one on our

2

June calendar. State of Utah versus Dcon Cloptcn. I assume you've

3

had a chance, on behalf of the Petitioner, to give your times to the

4

clerk, so if you'd indicate your appearances for the record we can

5

begin.

6

ZIMMERMAN:

7

Troy Boohcr and Michael Zimmerman, Snell and Wilmer. for

the Petitioner, Dcon Clopten.

8

JUSTICE DURIIAM:

9

GRAY:

io

12

Jeff Gray, on behalf of the State.

JUSTICE DURHAM:

11

Thank you.

Alright, thank you. You may proceed for the

petitioner.
ZIMMERMAN:

Good morning. Your Honors. On behalf of my client. Dcon

13

Cloptcn, we ask this Court to change the approach taken by Utah

14

courts to the admission of expert testimony on the unreliability of

15

eyewitness identifications. We ask the trial courts be instructed that

16

they are to weigh proffered eyewitness expert testimony by the same

17

702 and 403 rules of evidence standards they apply when addressing

18

any other proffer of expert witness. And we ask the trial courts be

19

told that in deciding whether to admit expert eyewitness testimony,

20

they should not consider whether or not a Long cautionary

21

instruction may be given. In the present case, the application of this

22

approach leads to the conclusion that the trial court abused its
Slate v Cloptcn

2

Oial Aigument 6/1/2009

discretion in excluding Dr. Dodd's testimony. The error was not
harmless. Much of the initial eyewitness testimony was uncertain as
to the identity of the shooter and focused on his clothing. And that
evidence, and the testimony they gave initially, or the comments
they made initially, is fully consistent with the finding that Freddy
White, not Dcon Cloptcn, was actually the shooter. Only over time
did the witnesses' testimony become solidified and certain that it
was Deon Cloptcn. Had Dr. Dodd testified there is a reasonable
likelihood the jury would have found a reasonable doubt to believe
that Deon Cloptcn was the murderer. The certiorari question which
this Court framed for the parties is quote, wtWhcther a timely request
for expert testimony regarding the reliability of eyewitness
identification should be presumed admissible" unquote. Apparently,
the way this is framed has led the State to think we want Dr Dodd's
proffer, and other similar eyewitness expert proffers, to be treated as
special, and somehow presumed admissible. In fact, we're asking
just the opposite. We ask only that this expert evidence be
considered just as any other expert testimony under rules 702 and
403. It may well be that the sheer weight of the uncontradicted
scientific evidence showing the helpfulness of this sort of testimony
will, in the real world, create an operative presumption that it should
be admitted, unless the State can show the circumstances which
3

OialAigumenl 6/1/2009

1

make eyewitness testimony unreliable are not present. But that does

2

not mean we are asking for a special rule only a level playing field

3

for determining the admissibility of this evidence. In the present

4

case, we're quite confident that Dr. Dodd's proposed testimony,

5

which is summarized at page 252 to 263 of the record, can meet both

6

Utah Rule of Evidence 702 as it existed in 2006, when this case was

7

tried, and as it exists today. And it will not run afoul of Rule 403. I

8

said that we ask that this expert testimony receive no special

9

treatment. At present, expert eyewitness testimony does receive

10

special treatment in Utah. It is not admitted, when other expert

11

testimony on analogous subjects would be admitted. No trial court

12

ruling excluding expert eyewitness testimony has ever been

13

overturned, so long as a Long cautionary instruction is given. I think

14

it's fair to say language in this Court's decisions has encouraged trial

15

courts to exclude proffered expert eyewitness testimony, with

16

confidence that they will not be reversed.

17

JUSTICE PARRISII:

18
19

But Counsel, I guess we've not reversed a trial court

for admitting it, but at the same token, . . .
ZIMMERMAN:

Thai's true, Your Honor. That's true. But the fact that you

20

have never reversed it, and that you've said things in your opinions

21

suggesting it's unnecessary, has produced what the State told the

??

trial judge was a quote,"trend" unquote, to deny its admission. And
State v. Clopten
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1

that's an undeniable trend. The trial court here manifested that same

2

special approach when it ruled on Dr. Dodd's testimony. The judge

3

rejected it, reasoning, first, that it wouldn't assist the jury because

4

quote, "the Long instruction does an adequate job", unquote. He

5

then said Dr. Dodd's testimony would only quote, "confuse the

6

issue." And then he said, rather oddly, that the proffered evidence of

7

Dr. Dodd was cumulative of the Long instruction, which is not

8

evidence. He therefore concluded the testimony was superfluous

9

and would have no bearing on the jury's decision.

10

JUSTICE PARRISH:

So, Counsel, the complaint that you have with the way

11

in which the trial judge exercised his discretion was simply his

12

consideration of the Long instruction in the calculus of weighing

13

whether or not the expert testimony ought to be admitted? If we

14

could remove his consideration of the Long instruction, then you

15

would have no basis for complaint?

16

ZIMMERMAN:

If you remove the consideration and also educate the trial

17

judges of this State as to the fact that expert eyewitness testimony

18

does not confuse the jury, is in fact helpful, if you actually took the

19

science and looked at the fact that our judges need education about

20

what this testimony does, that would be sufficient. I think if you

21

look, particularly, at study number 14 in our bulky addenda, and 1

22

know it's kind of a pain, but that is a survey of 160 trial judges, and
State v. Clopten

5

Oral Argument 6/1/2009

1

a few appellate judges, as to what they know about expert

2

eyewitness testimony, what they know about its unreliability, and

3

what they don't know and, in fact, it's fair to say that it shows they

4

slightly know more than jurors, but they don't know very much.

5

And that not knowing very much is precisely why this testimony

6

does not get considered as it ought to be. Now, I would like to

7

address why we think the presence of a Long instruction should not

8

be taken into account. Long was decided in '86, 23 years ago.

9

According to the opinion, it was in response to four circumstances

10

that existed at that time: first, strong scientific evidence that

11

eyewitness identifications have many pitfalls in their reliability.

12

Second, equally strong evidence that those pitfalls are

13

counterintuitive. People don't understand them, they don't believe

14

them as a matter of course. Third, eyewitness testimony has a

15

tremendously strong probative effect on jurors whether or not it's

16

accurate. And, fourth, at that time that Utah trial courts routinely

17

refused to give cautionary instructions when asked. In light of the

18

science and the risk of wrongful convictions, the Long court ruled

19

that cautionary instructions should be given to point out the potential

20

weaknesses in eyewitness testimony.

21

JUSTICE DURHAM:

22

ZIMMERMAN:
State v. Clopten

And that was, in fact, the only issue in Long, wasn't. . .

That was, there was no other issue. . . .
6
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1

JUSTICE DURHAM:

2

ZIMMERMAN:

. . . whether the instruction should be given.

Now, it is worth noting that, in light of today. Long observed

3

in a footnote, number 5, on page 492 that there was one 1976 study

4

at the time suggesting that cautionary instructions wouldn't work

5

and, in fact, the most they would do is make jurors skeptical but not

6

sensitize them to being able to discriminate between reliable and

7

unreliable testimony. But the Court said in that footnote, even

8

though the Court went ahead and imposed the need for instruction, it

9

said, quote "full evaluation of the efficacy of cautionary instructions

10

must await further experience," Well, that further experience is

n

here, 23 years later. It shows that cautionary jury instructions arc

12

not effective, no matter how they're written. If you look at the study

13

in Item 2 of our appendix, you'll see that research has confirmed

14

exactly what that 1976 study said that's cited in Long's footnote.

15

Instructions alone do not make jurors more likely to be able to

16

discriminate between reliable and unreliable eyewitness testimony.

17

Therefore, today, things are today as they were when Long was

18

decided. Defendants, against whom eyewitness evidence is

19

introduced, today have the same risk of wrongful conviction that

20

prompted the imposition of the Long requirement.

State v Cloptcn
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i

JUSTICE DURRANT:

Counsel, is that research more broadly applicable?

2

That is, as a general matter, are jury instructions this ineffective or

3

less ineffective than expert eye testimony. . .

4

ZIMMERMAN:

I think, excuse me, Justice Durrani. I think in this case the

5

reason, if you look at that study that's in item 14 in the tabs, you'll

6

see the reason that this is particularly ineffective is all of us think we

7

know what we see. We think we know what we remember, and we

8

think we're accurate. And, in fact, we're not. And that's just a

9

fundamental fact about being a human being that never goes away.

10

JUSTICE DURRANT:

11

ZIMMERMAN:

But that goes to memory, generally.

Yes, it does. But it's particularly acute because the law relics

12

so heavily on eyewitness identification. Eet me just point one thing

13

that is, in fact, present today that wasn't present in 1986. Up until

14

recently, you could say with a certain surety, you couldn't be

15

contradicted with hard evidence, that the system does not often

16

convict innocent people. In 1995, the U. S. Supreme Court said it

17

was, quote "extremely rare" unquote, for people to have meritorious

18

claims of innocence. But within a few years, the DNA revolution

19

has shown that not to be true. The study in tab 7 points out that, as

20

of the writing of that article in 2006, 340 serious felony convictions

21

have been overturned, people have been exonerated- since 1989. Of

22

those. 88 percent, it's estimated, of the rape cases resulted from bad
State v. Cloptcn
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1

eyewitness identification. Fifty percent of the murder convictions

2

resulted from bad eyewitness identification. If s the most potent

3

evidence, because the witnesses believe they're telling the truth.

4

Cross examination is worthless.

5

JUSTICE WILKJNS:

6

ZIMMERMAN:

7

JUSTICE WILKINS:

8

ZIMMERMAN:

9

JUSTICE WILKINS:

10
11

Which tab again. Counsel?

That's tab 7, page 00205.
What was the total number of cases during that. . .

Three hundred and forty.
What was the total number of cases during that same

period of time where there were convictions?
ZIMMERMAN:

I have no idea. I don't know how many cases actually had

12

DNA evidence either. If you extrapolate those percentages, those

13

are only convictions where DNA was available. It docsnT talk about

14

cases where people were convicted solely on eyewitness testimony.

15

JUSTICE WILKINS:

16

ZIMMERMAN:

n

JUSTICE WILKINS:

18

ZIMMERMAN:

19

JUSTICE WILKINS:

Ok. I understand it to be of the 340 cases. . .

Thaf s right.
. . .eighty-eight. . .

Eighty-eight percent.
. . .yeah, but were there 340,000 convictions during the

20

relevant period, or three hundred and forty million convictions

21

during the relevant period? I mean, extremely rare could still be the

22

case if the total number o[ felony convictions is monstrously huge.
Slate v Cloptcn
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1

ZIMMERMAN:

I suppose it could be the case, Justice Wilkins, if, in fact, you

2

assume that the cases in which DNA c\ idcncc is available to

3

contradict an eyewitness arc somehow more eyewitness evidence

4

dependant than cases in which there is no DNA evidence to

5

contradict the eyewitness.

6

JUS flCE WILKINS:

7

ZIMMERMAN:

8

JUS riCE NEIIRING:

9

If that rate of error is extrapolated. . .
Can you contemplate an expert rendering an opinion

that expert testimony is so unreliable that it should not be considered

10
11

Ell read it more carefully.

at all in a case?
ZIMMERMAN:

No, not based on the science. I can contemplate a case where

12

the expert is insufficiently qualified. I can contemplate a case where

13

it's an eyewitness only identification; you arc identifying a close

14

friend, a relative. In that case, the biases and the weaknesses in

15

eyewitness identification arc unlikely to be present. And in that

16

case, a judge might say 'You know, in this case none of your

17

testimony is going to have any bearing. Em not going to admit it/

18

JUS flCE NEIIRING:

Arc you aware of cases in which trial courts have

19

permitted expert testimony on the question of the reliability of

20

eyewitness testimony which have been appealed?

21

ZIMMERMAN:

22

I am not. I know that Dr. Dodd's resume, and again, al the

record 252, says that he's testified in twenty cases in Utah and
State v Cloplcn
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1

Colorado. So he's testified somewhere, but Fm unfamiliar with the

2

appeal of any of those cases.

3

JUSTICE NEHRING:

4
5

Maybe he's so effective that they generate acquittals

and you'll never see an appeal.
ZI MM! TIM AN:

Well, if you actually, if you look at the studies about how

6

strong eyewitness identification is, how much we believe it, no

7

matter what. . . let me just read item six, the opening page of item six

8

in our tabs. It talks about a fellow who was convicted of bad checks,

9

29 bad check convictions. Seventeen eyewitnesses identified him as

10

the guy who passed the bad checks. He was later exonerated, and

11

the prosecutor said

12

how so many persons could have sworn the innocent man was the

13

one who cashed the checks? The two men were as dissimilar in

14

appearance as could be. There was several inches difference in

15

height, and there wasn't any similarity about them. To this day, I

16

cannot understand the positivencss of those witnesses. I know they

17

fell they were swearing the truth. 1 know the police felt the man was

18

guilty." So this is a case where the seeing is not believing is the

19

reverse of the old adage.

20

JUSTICE DURRANI:

21
22

Cw

When the two men stood at the bar. I wondered

Counsel, what would preclude, if anything, the use of

experts as to the general fallibility of memory?
ZIMMERMAN:
State v. Cloptcn

Nothing.
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i

JUSTICE DURRANT:

2

ZIMMERMAN:

What standard would we apply in. . . .

I think State v. Adams, which Justice Wilkins wrote, is a case

3

where there was an expert who got on the stand and basically said

4

there was about a rape conviction of a Downs syndrome girl, a

5

woman. And the expert got on the stand and said, t Cognitivcly\ . .

6

the defense was she'd been coached by her mother because her

7

mother was estranged from the accused rapist. And the expert got

8

on the stand and said, 'Cognitivcly, I don't believe this woman could

9

be coached. She can't count to fifty. She can't remember her

10

birthday. I don't believe it's possible to coach her/ And that was

11

challenged on the grounds that the testimony went to the truth telling

12

of the witness. And this Court said no, subtle difference, just like

13

the Rimmasch case. It's not about whether she's telling the truth,

14

it's about her cognitive capacity. And that's. I think Justice Wilkins

15

said, that's a fine distinction, but it's a distinction. In this case. I

16

would say one of the things that's been, one of the critiques leveled

17

against this kind of testimony, is it's going, invading the province of

18

the jury. Invading the province of the jury really means, if you

19

deconstruct that language, it means the jury knows this already. The

20

evidence is the jury docs not know this already. And. secondly, this

21

is just like the Adams case. This is evidence about the capacity of

22

the witness to know whether they're telling the truth.
State v Cloptcn
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1

JUSTICE DURHAM:

2

Counsel, arc there more questions? Sorry, your time

has expired.

3

ZIMMERMAN:

Em having so much fun I didn't realize the time had run out.

4

JUSTICE DURHAM:

5

GRAY:

Thank you. You may respond.

May it please the Court, Counsel Jeff Gray on behalf of the State.

6

The State's position in this case is simple. Under Utah law, trial

7

judges stand as gatekeepers to the admission of expert testimony.

8

There should be no special exception for expert testimony on

9

eyewitness identification.

10

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Well, given the presence of the Long case, which is

11

very unusual, I can't think of any other circumstance in which we

12

have approved a cautionary instruction of this type, have we not

13

created an evidentiary situation which is causing trial courts to

14

believe that Long performs some kind of evidentiary function and,

15

therefore, they're disadvantaging what would otherwise be fairly

16

standard expert testimony on memory, cognitive capacity,

17

eyewitness testimony, other things which we permit, and generally

18

encourage so long as they fall within the admissibility standards?

19

GRAY:

Urn

20

JUSTICE DURHAM:

It seems to me what makes this whole set of

21

circumstances special is not the treatment that's sought to be

22

afforded to this expert testimony, but this Court's action in
State v Cloptcn
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1

approving a Long instruction in the hope. 23 years ago, that it would

2

improve circumstances, given the science.

3

GRAY:

4

And. no doubt, I think Long actually did improve circumstances,
but. . .

5

JUSTICH DURHAM:

6

GRAY:

You got any empirical evidence for that?

Urn, yeah, 1 mean, there's been. . . let's talk about those studies that

7

the defendant has cited as far as the effectiveness of instructions.

8

Most of those studies concerned the Telfaire instruction, and it's

9

pretty much universally found that there's some problems with that

10

as, quite frankly, this Court recognized in Long. They are relying on

11

two studies, two studies involving a total of, it's either, 1*11 go 350.

12

It's either 250 or 350, but three hundred and fifty subjects. And,

13

what Greene found is that it did help them. It did help jurors

14

understand those things. Now, the jury isn't out on that. But we've

15

got three hundred and. . . .

16

JUSTICE DURHAM:

But, I guess my question is why should we stick with

17

the whole notion of a cautionary instruction which, as this trial judge

18

understood it, apparently is perceived, somehow, to perform an

19

evidentiary function? Why shouldn't we move ahead and use the

20

standard evidentiary rules to look at the admissibility of expert

21

testimony in a standard fashion?

22

GRAY:
State v. Cloptcn
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1

JUSTICE DURHAM:

2

GRAY:

Ok, I thought you did.

Yes, we actually agree with that approach. In fact, first of all, the

3

cases that this Court has decided on expert testimony regarding

4

eyewitness identification, they never created this presumption that

5

it's inadmissible.

6

JUSTICE PARRISH:

7
8

But has, in practice, has that been the way the trial

courts of this State have read our prior case law?
GRAY:

9

Not at all. Let's take a look at Judge Fuchs in this very case. He
noted that he had two prior cases where the defense asked that Dr.

10

Dodd testify. In one of those cases he didn't allow the testimony. In

11

the other case, he allowed the testimony. Alright, so he clearly

12

understood that it was within his discretion. And in Hollcn, which

13

was decided by this case, the district court allowed the testimony,

14

but didn't allow it to a certain extent.

15

JUSTICE PARRISH:

Ok, but in this case, one of the factors that the Court

16

considered in exercising his discretion to not allow the expert

17

testimony was the existence of the Long instruction. Agreed?

is

GRAY:

Yes.

19

JUSTICE PARRISH:

And why shouldn't we just put an end to that? I mean,

20

the Long instruction isn't evidence, so why should the existence of

21

the Long instruction play any part in the trial judge's decision as to

22

whether or not the expert testimony should be admissible?
Slate v. Cloplcn
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1

GRAY:

Well, what we'd be doing is setting up a situation where we could

2

never use, where counsel could never rely on the Long instruction.

3

If there was a case of eyewitness identification, counsel would be

4

ineffective if he did not go for the expert testimony, if he did not ask

5

for expert testimony as opposed to the Long instruction.

6

JUST1CL DURHAM:

7

GRAY:

8
9

What's wrong with that?

Because we do not have the evidence that the Long instruction is
ineffective. Again, we have two studies . . .

JUSTICL DURIIAM:

But we still have a functional problem that Justice

10

ParrislTs question goes to, which is that a jury instruction does not

11

ordinarily serve to give the jury evidence.

12

GRAY:

Right, ok, and I think where counsel, one thing that I think this Court

13

should do is disavow the notion that if it's simply a lecture to the

14

jury, that trial courts should not allow the expert testimony.

15

JUSTICL NL11RING:

What docs it mean to be simply a lecture to the jury?

16

Please tell me what witness, of any stripe, is not lecturing the jury?

17

Any effort to persuade a jury, anything a witness says is a lecture at

18

some level.

19

JUSTICL DURHAM:

20

GRAY:

You agree with that, don't you?

Yes. Yes. I mean, what the expert testimony cases on this particular

21

area have talked about is this amounts to nothing more than a lecture

22

to the jury and, therefore, we can rely on the Long instruction. And
State v Cloptcn
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1

Em saying that, you know, in light, that's really not an appropriate

2

basis alone to deny the expert testimony. Alright? And 1 think what

3

the Court was talking about when it was talking about a lecture to

4

the jury, about general principles and so forth, that clearly if we look

5

at the new rule 702 and the comment thereto, it recognizes that we

6

can have expert testimony that gives a dissertation or exposition of

7

the principles. And we don't disagree with that. But again, let's

8

turn back to the gate-keeping function of the trial courts.

9

JUSTICE WILKINS:

What I hear you saying, Mr. Gray, is that the State

10

doesn't object to the use of an expert talking about the reliability of

11

eyewitness testimony if the trial judge finds that it's necessary and

12

appropriativc, more probative than unduly prejudicial, that it's not

13

invading the province of the jury, that it's carefully crafted, that it's

14

subject to cross-examination.

15

GRAY:

Yes.

16

JUSTICE WILKINS:

17

GRAY:

18

JUSTICE WILKINS:

Is that what I hear you saying?

Yes.
Well then, if that's the case, why not rely upon the trial

19

judges to exercise that gatekeeping function, address it as a matter o[

20

expert testimony, and eliminate the routine use of an instruction

21

which doesn't seem to allow for that? Am I misunderstanding what

22

you're objection is?
State v Cloplcn
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GRAY:

2

I don't have, I mean, I think the day of reliance on the Long
instruction solely . . .

3

JUSTICE WILKINS:

4

GRAY:

5

JUSTICE WILKINS:

6

GRAY:

7

JUSTICE WILKINS:

8
9

May be over.

. . . is probably over.
Yeah.

Ok.
So what are we talking about here? I'm struggling to

find out what it is you disagree with Mr. Zimmerman about.
GRAY:

Ok, let's talk about that. I was getting to the gatekeeping function.

10

Now, Mr. Zimmerman suggests that they're not changing anything,

11

that there's no special exception by, but, no court. What he wants is

12

the Court to recognize or create a presumption of admissibility. That

13

is not found anywhere, by this Court or by any other court.

14

(multiple people speaking)

15

JUSTICE DURHAM:

16
17

Ok, I'll be gatekeeper. You go first and we'll work

down the row.
JUSTICE NEHRING:

What I sense is that either through an accretion of

18

culture around Long, or some other way, that courts are predisposed

19

to believe that expert testimony about the reliability of eyewitness is

20

not helpful. And that helpfulness is, as I understand the rule, that's

21

the only criterion. Is it helpful, or isn't.

22

GRAY:
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JUSTICE NEHRING:

2
3

Well, that's a subset of helpfulness. Unreliable expert

testimony cannot, by definition, be helpful.
GRAY:

Well, as I see it, there's three basic gatekeeping functions of the trial

4

court. First, it's to ensure that the scientific principles and

5

techniques underlying the proffered testimony arc reliable.

6

JUSTICE PARRISII:

7
8

And in this case there's not a lot of dispute about the

scientific evidence.
GRAY:

As far as these particular studies arc concerned, I don't think so. 1

9

mean, they use, I mean, this is probabilistic, this is something that

10

the Court. . .

11

JUSTICE PARRISIi:

Isn't it the nature of the scientific evidence that, in

12

fact, gives rise to the presumption that Mr. Zimmerman is asking

13

for? Does the fact that everybody acknowledges eyewitness

14

testimony is fallible, that jurors don't appreciate it, because of the

15

undisputed nature of the science, you're going to result in a situation

16

where it's going to be helpful and come in?

17

GRAY:

To a certain extent it is. We agree that jurors, that the average juror,

18

alright, believes that expert test-, or believes that eyewitness

19

identification is more reliable than it might be. We believe that there

20

are factors that are counter intuitive, ok, to juror understanding. But

21

now we have experts who get on the stand, and Mr. Zimmerman

State v Cloptcn
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w ants a blank check. They can testify to anything they want to

2

because they're an expert on that.

3

JUSTICE DURHAM:

4

I suspect Mr. Zimmerman's going to get up and say

they don't want a blank check.

5

GRAY:

1 le won't say that, but. . .

6

JUSTICE DURHAM:

And I can't imagine that this Court w/ould write him or

7

any other defense lawyer such a blank check. So, maybe if you'd

8

focus on specifically the standards that you think should be part of a

9

Court opinion on this question.

10

GRAY:

Ok. Again, ok. so the first gatekeeping function is to determine, ok.

11

to assure that the scientific principles and techniques undcrl) ing the

12

testimony is reliable. The second one is that the court ensures that

13

the proffered testimony is founded on those principles and is

14

otherwise relevant to the work at hand. Alright? And then the third

15

one would be the court ensures that on balance, the proffered

16

testimony will be helpful to the jury.

17

JUS VICli DURIIAM:

18

GRAY:

19
20

Pretty standard stuff.

Pretty standard. But again, if you look at, according to the defendant,
they want a presumption of admissibility.

JUSTICE DURHAM:

That's never been. . .

Actually, what I think they really want, and it's

21

difficult to deal with the language here, the) want us to knock down

22

the presumption of inadmissibility that the presence of the Long
State v Cloptcn
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instruction has created in the minds of many trial judges. And you

2

have no objection to that, 1 take it?

3

GRAY:

4
5

would agree that that ought to be knocked down.
JUSTICE PARRISII:

6
7

And, in fact, the existence of the Long instruction

shouldn't play any role in the judges' exercise of discretion?
GRAY:

8
9

No. To the extent that there's a presumption of inadmissibility, we

Well, I think it can. and let me explain. That third point, as far as
the proffered testimony, whether or not it'll be helpful to the fact

finder.

This Court has recognized that expert testimony, in itself,

10

carries some dangers of undue reliance on the expert testimony

11

itself, also misuse and confusion of the issues. So, it's still a

12

balancing, that the helpfulness determination requires a case by case

13

inquiry where the trial judge balances the probative value of the

14

proffered testimony in a particular case against the danger its

15

admission poses. It is not conducive to the one size fits all approach

16

the defendant proposes.

17

JUSTICE WILKINS:

You've got to get over there. We know Mr.

18

Zimmerman and I think you know that he doesn't always get his

19

way with this Court and, historically, has not always gotten his way

20

with this Court. So deal with us and not with him. But, what I hear

21

you saying is that you donT have any problem with treating expert

22

testimony regarding eyewitness identification as an expert under our
State v Cloptcn
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1

ordinary rubric of rule, and that you would include the possibility of

2

a jury instruction, as opposed to expert testimony, when, in the trial

3

judge's well founded discretion, that made more sense for helping

4

the jury.

5

GRAY:

6

JUSTICE WILKINS:

7

GRAY:

8

JUSTICE WILKINS:

9
10

Yes.
Is there something more to it than that?

Well, let's take a look at Rimmasch.
Let's not, but go ahead, (multiple people speaking) Lm

sorry, go ahead.
JUSTICE DURHAM:

Well, but I may want to stop you. It's hard for me to

11

see how this is Rimmasch territory at all. The Rimmasch rule and

12

standard was created for novel, new, experimental science that had

13

not yet reached a generally accepted status in the scientific

14

community. And it's hard to sec where this stuff has been around

15

for a couple of decades or more, and is very well accepted, not just

16

by the scientists but by courts, would be in the Rimmasch category.

17

GRAY:

Let me explain. First of all, the science, what we know that's been

18

around for a couple of decades, if s limited. And I think it's

19

important that courts to note that. In other words, we know that

20

eyewitness identification is not as reliable. . .

21

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Slate v Clopten
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GRAY:

. . .we know certain factors. But the science is not mature to the

2

extent that we can say ; ok, because this factor is present here,

3

therefore this witness is therefore less reliable.' Because it takes. . .

4

JUST1CR DURHAM:

But that doesn't mean that it's novel, it just means that

5

it's limited, and it wouldn't be admissible if it wasn't strong enough

6

to go to the case, to the facts of the case before the court,

7

GRAY:

8
9

Well, all I'm suggesting is that there's lots of studies and the studies
are ongoing.

JUSTICE DURHAM:

10

GRAY:

11

JUSTICE DURHAM:

12

GRAY:

Sure. That's right, I understand that.

The studies arc ongoing.
But that doesn't get me to Rimmasch.

Well, ok. let me say. Ok, first of all, as part of the helpfulness, and

13

Rimmasch talked about this, and I'm not going back to the novel

14

scientific, it was talking about the helpfulness issue. And it talked

15

about the nature of the testimony, and I think we have to take

16

account of that. Ok. This is, I mean, we're talking about statistical

17

probabilities and about the average person. . . .

18

JUSTICE W1EKINS:

But Mr. Gray, if your position is, as I understand it,

19

that the trial judge, as gatekeeper, should evaluate that. Then, are

20

you asking us to evaluate that as a broad blanket and say it's not

21

admissible?

22

GRAY:
State v Cloptcn

No, not at all.
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1

JUSTICE WILKINS:

2
3

Arc you asking us to evaluate it as a broad blanket and

say it is admissible?
GRAY:

f m asking the Court, as in any other expert testimony situation,

4

they look at it and determine whether or not the trial court abused its

5

discretion.

6

JUSTICE WILKINS:

Ok, so now we're shifting to this case, as opposed to

7

the general proposition? Is that where I lost you? Because as a

8

general proposition, what I understand you saying is if we just apply

9

our rules the way they're written and we should be ok.

io

GRAY:

Yes, yes.

11

JUSTICE WILKINS:

12

GRAY:

Ok. So, in this case what happens if we do that?

In this case one of the things is the quality of the other evidence

13

available. A n d let's take a look at the quality of the other evidence

14

available. First. Defendant was identified b) Melissa Valde/, a

15

concert goer who spoke with Defendant. . .

16

JUSTICE: DURHAM:

But this goes, this goes then to the assumption that

17

there's error, and we're looking at whether the error was harmless.

18

That's when you're looking for quality of the other evidence.

ic)

GRAY:

Well. I'm not sure what our courts' decisions have talked about with

20

respect to helpfulness, but they do say that you look at the qualit}' of

21

the other evidence.

22

JUSTICE DURHAM:
State v Cloptcn
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GRAY:

Ok.

2

JUSTICE DURHAM:

An analysis of the helpfulness of expert testimony on

3

the function of human memory, it seems to me, would not be

4

dependent on the fact that there were seventeen other eyewitnesses

5

who were 100% sure this person was the defendant.

6

GRAY:

I think it would, I think it would. And, you know, when you have

7

the, when you proffer the testimony the State can demonstrate what

8

witnesses and what evidence they tend to call. And it can be. you

9

know, if you have one witness, and it's solely based on one witness,

10

then I think it would be an abuse of discretion, in any case, to not

11

allow the expert testimony. But where you have other corroborating

12

evidence, I donT think it would be.

13

JUSTICE PARRISH:

But what about the studies that were cited in Mr.

14

Zimmerman's brief that indicate even when you have other

15

corroborating evidence it's still a problem, because if the other

16

corroborating evidence is really weak, even if the eyewitness

17

identification is almost so weak as to be completely not helpful,

18

juries will still tend to convict.

19

GRAY:

Well, ok, he's cited all these studies and a lot of them match the

20

studies with what he would propose to testify. One of the big things

21

that they focus on is this idea of transference. If they've seen him
before they may misidentify him afterwards. Nowhere in the
State v Cloptcn
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1

summary of Dr. Dodd's testimony did he discuss that, nor did he

2

discuss that when the trial court asked what he was going to discuss.

3

And now Defendant would have us cherry pick this study out there

4

and say 'this would have affected the whole thing.' And we don't

5

even know the reliability of these studies either,

6

JUSTICE DURRANT:

Counsel, let me take another factor and just ask you

7

how you suggest that we approach it? Take the presence of a

8

weapon, take the presence of a weapon. Would you agree that the

9

science is reliable and in support the conclusion that the presence of

10

a weapon may diminish reliability?

li

GRAY:

12

JUSTTCli DURRANT:

13
14

That it can. yes.
That it can. So we're over that hurdle, and we have

that issue in this case.
GRAY:

Well, what's interesting is most of those studies is when the subject,

15

or the witness feels threatened. Alright. And in this case, for

16

example. Ms. Valdc/. she was never felt threatened by that, so that

17

weapon focus isn't applicable.

18

JUSTICE DURRANT:

19

Well, she should certainly be allowed to argue that and

put on an expert to that. . .

20

GRAY:

21

JUS'l ICE DURRANT:

22

You know, in this case . . .
. . .point, but would you quarrel with their expert

testifying to that particular factor?
State v. Cloptcn
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1

GRAY:

2

JUSTICE DURRANT:

3
4

No. But again
And that would be regardless of the corroborative

evidence, J take it?
GRAY:

You know, right, okay, it's within the trial court's discretion. I think

5

Judge Fuchs could just as easily, and he almost did, allow the expert

6

testimony, and it certainly would not be an abuse of his discretion.

7

There are so many factors. I mean, he was identified by Andre

8

Ilamby, alright, the red clothing. They make a lot of coh. this was

9

just based on the red clothing.'

Well, one of the things Dr. Dodd

10

himself testified, or indicated in his summary, he didn't testify, but

11

indicated in his summary, is that people pick that out quite readily.

12

JUSTICE DURHAM:

13

Well, but then you had a witness from across the street

who said the shooter got in the backseat of the car.

14

GRAY:

15

JUSTICE DURHAM:

16

I'm sorry, I. . . .
And then you had a witness from across the street who

said the shooter got into the passenger side of the car.

17

GRAY:

Yeah, and they were on the 11th floor. . .

18

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Yeah, but my point is you want to rely on

19

corroborative testimony to assess helpfulness. You've got a lot of

20

confusion in this case.

21

GRAY:

22

Well, again, I guess the question is, in this case. . . first of all, this
proposal by Counsel at this time, was never proposed to the trial

State v Cloptcn
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court. I mean, they quabbled with whether or not it was sufficient.

2

But what we're relying on in this case, if we go down to the specifics

3

of this case, is was the instruction sufficient to educate the jury on

4

the various matters? And, I think if you look at that it was. And the

5

research. I know my time, if 1 could finish. . . .

6

JUSTICH DURHAM:

7

GRAY:

Finish your sentence.

The research has not matured to the extent that we just throw out

8

jury instructions and say they're of no use. And with that, we ask

9

the Court to affirm. Thank you.

10

JUSTICE DURHAM:

11
12

Alright. Thank you very much Mr. Gray. You may

reply.
JUSTICH PARRISI1:

Counsel, what is your, under your proposal, what is the

13

place of a Long-type instruction in a case where expert testimony is

14

admitted? Should the cautionary instruction be given nevertheless.

15

or do we just throw it out entirely?

16

Z1MMHRMAN:

You know, I doiTt honestly know the answer to that. Judge. I

17

think the c\ idence is pretty clear that no matter, you know, in Long

18

there was a proposal to change the Teliairc instruction, like this

19

would fix things, and the studies, I guess there were three studies,

20

suggest that rewriting it docsnT much matter. There is some

21

indication that it makes juries a little more skeptical of eyewitness

11

testimony. There's no evidence of, that it makes them more
Stale v Cloptcn
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sensitive to discriminating between the truthful, not the truthful. I

2

don't want to say truth, everybody's telling the truth, between the

3

accurate and inaccurate testimony. So docs it fulfill a function? It's

4

hard to say. The eyewitness. . .the big difference about putting on a

5

live eyewitness, and I think the State's missing a little bit, is if, in

6

fact, these eyewitnesses, an expert goes on, the State gets to put an

7

expert on, the State gets to cross-examine the expert, and the real

8

impact, I think, is that this evidence comes in as part of the trial.

9

This is not read to the jury as one page out of twenty-five pages of

10

instructions, this is part of the heart of the trial. And the more

11

critical it is, you can assume, the more it's going to be argued over to

12

the jury. So it's really going to make this a focus. In that context

13

does the Long instruction matter? It may not matter. Do you throw

14

it out? I don't know the answer to your question, candidly. You

15

know, the cautious approach would be to not throw it out, maybe

16

you do.

17

JUSTICK NRIIRING:

18

ZI MM] TIM AN:

19

JUSTICE NEI HUNG:

But the other thing. . .
(unintclliblc) doing much?

Yes.
Would you believe it should be possible for an expert

20

witness to render opinions critical of the observations made in the

21

Long instruction? Is that fair game? Is the Long instruction fair

22

game?
Slate v Cloptcn
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ZIMMERMAN:

I suppose that's possible. I mean, you know, the Long

2

instruction is generalized, as all these are. That's the problem, is

3

they tend to be generalized and they miss some things.

4

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Well, it occurs to me the State might object to giving

5

the Long instruction after you had already had all the evidence from

6

the expert witness on the theory that it unfairly emphasized a

7

particular set of evidence at trial,

8

ZIMMERMAN:

That's a good point, that's a good point.

9

JUSTICE WILKINS:

Mr. Zimmerman, was any effort made in this case to

10

craft an instruction that would have addressed the deficiencies you

11

sec?

12

ZIMMERMAN:

No, the objection was basically to not permitting the expert

13

on. I think, given the science, there's no reason here to believe that

14

an expert, differently crafted instruction would have made any

15

difference. I think that, going to the corroboration point, and the

16

State's talking about, you know, there were so many eyewitnesses

17

here, what I just read you was seventeen eyewitnesses convicting

18

this guy of cashing bad checks. Seventeen independent

19

eyewitnesses. There's a great study Justice Parrish may have

20

alluded to. a hypothetical that's in all the articles, where they

21

construct a hypothetical sort of 7-11 robbery, and there's

22

circumstancial evidence. 18% of the mock jurors convict. They
State v. Cloptcn

30

Oral Argument 6/1/2009

1

then have the clerk say 'that's the guy.' 72% convict. Then they put

2

in evidence that the clerk is legally blind and isn't wearing his

3

classes. 68% convict. The fact is, people think eyewitness

4

testimony is it. They want something to grab on to, and another

5

human being telling them a fact makes them believe it. Because

6

they think they know what they sec, and they think they remember

7

things. And the fact is they don't. In this case. I would really point

8

out that it isn't only that there's testimony the shooter got in the

9

passenger side of the car, there's testimony that the shooter was

10

wearing a red jacket. Well, the only person wearing a long sleeve,

11

red piece of clothing by the time the police pulled over his car was

12

Mr. Cloptcn. He was the only one in the show-up that had a long

13

sleeve, red shirt on. But, in fact, there was a long sleeve, red

14

sweatshirt in the backseat of the car that the police ignored, that was

15

left in the car, and when the car was claimed by a third person the

16

sweatshirt disappeared.

17
18
19

JUSTICE DURIIAM:

And was that testimony about the existence of the red

sweatshirt presented to the jury?
ZIMMERMAN:

There's a stipulation in the record, the last page of the record.

20

there's a stipulation from the State. There was a sweatshirt, and it

21

was turned over to somebody who took the car away, and nobody

22

knows what it is. And there's a discrepancy in the evidence. Ms.
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1

Valdcz says that the sweatshirt worn by the shooter did not have

2

logos on it. did not have a zipper front. Mr, ClopteiTs sweatshirt had

3

logos and a zipper front. We don't know what the other sweatshirt

4

looked like. Thank you.

5

JUSTICE DURHAM:

Alright. Thank you very much. Counsel. We

6

appreciate the argument this morning. We will take the case under

7

advisement.

8
9
10

State v Cloptcn

32

Oral Argument 6/1/2009

